Standing in Harm's Way: Should the UN Have Its Own Army?

Since its very inception the United Nations has, on many levels, struggled to define its own values and purpose; and nowhere has this been more evident than in the discussions surrounding collective security and the use of force. The provisions of Chapter 8 (articles 43-47) of the UN Charter, which envisage the creation of permanent military structures under UN command, have never been implemented and continue to be the subject of debate even today—as they were in 1948 when first raised by then Secretary General, Trygve Lie. However, with the explosion of intra-state warfare, and the all-too-recent peacekeeping debacles in Rwanda, Kosovo and now Darfur, the debate surrounding the development of a UN Standing Army has intensified. Indeed, in this context, the key question is whether or not the ‘Chapter 6½’ approach taken thus far by UN peacekeeping is adequate to deal with the growing challenges of modern (and often internationalised) conflicts, or whether a new mandate for peace enforcement is now required.

	http://www.flickr.com/photos/85013738@N00/258809380/

The loudest calls for such a multilateral force come from those dismayed by the lengthy deployment time of UN peacekeepers, which allows conflicts to become entrenched and protracted before intervention arrives. Certainly, this issue formed the central critique of UN peacekeeping operations within the 2000 Brahimi Report, which sought to highlight the UN’s most pressing problems. Until now, the more successful interim solution to the stop-gap between the outbreak of conflict and peacekeeper’s arrival, has been to rely on UN-endorsed multinational forces, which facilitate both rapid deployment and a broader mandate concerning the legitimate use of force. The 1999 experience of INTERFET in Timor-Leste (supported by UN Resolution 1246), and NATO’s involvement in Kosovo, serve as key examples where explosive civil conflicts necessitate both active engagement and rapid response—both of which are lacking under the UN’s current model. Whilst these largely regional responses have served critical purposes in past conflicts, their sustainability is questionable; for a start, because the regional model runs the risk of creating new and dangerous issues in geopolitical relations. Australia (the overwhelming contributor of forces to INTERFET) has since faced accusations of improper influence over the newly-formed Timor-Leste in terms of maritime oil deposits, tracing back to their involvement with independence. When entire regions find themselves involved in continued discord, the situation becomes even more difficult. The recent African Union peacekeeping mission of 7,000 soldiers to Darfur has been seen in some regional circles as an attempt to undermine existing political relationships through power brokering within the continent. Thus, these perils of regional or unilateral action are mitigated by a multinational approach, which enhances credibility and transparency in such disputes.

Given the current global context, one of the greatest advantages of a multinational force would be its ability to take over from the United States as a significant military player within the international arena; unilateral action itself produces several more inherent problems that, whilst not eradicated by a UN Standing Army, would necessarily be lessened. The first is the financial cost associated with military missions—with the US spending upwards of $60 billion each year on its current commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is essential that funding for peace enforcement be drawn from a wider range of sources. Whilst the most realistic suggestion for the funding of a common force would be akin to other UN programs—proportional monetary contributions made by member states with optional expansion during times of emergency—many have contested that because of their significant military supremacy, reducing the US’ direct involvement in missions would similarly see a reduction in the overall capacity of funds. This may well be true. Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution has estimated that within the first six weeks of a hypothetical conflict, America could deploy and manage up to 250,000 troops. In contrast, the European members of NATO would very possibly fall short of 20,000 within the same timeframe. However, this approach to the situation ignores two major problems. The first is that the US can not possibly, nor has it shown the willingness to, engage in all theatres of conflict which require help. Whilst Iraq appeared as a credible threat on their radar, situations in Darfur and Rwanda have gone previously without (relative) note. Indeed, it is likely that Darfur has received less attention from the US than it would otherwise have because of their commitments in Iraq. As such, expanding the base of stake holders beyond the Atlantic means that smaller (but no less deserving) situations will be more fully considered. More broadly, however, one of the most significant reasons behind many countries’ limited contribution to Iraq (and particularly the Europeans’) has been the absence of UN approval. By legitimising collective action, the available pool of international resources is likely to grow in real terms.

The cornerstone of this scheme is its emphasis on regularity and continuity of contribution—elements which lead to the second advantage in limiting the role of the US as a global policeman. As has been demonstrated over the past two weeks with the lead up to, and outcome of, the mid-term elections, American public opinion (as with any constituency) has shown to have a direct and significant influence on its foreign policy. Upon the news that the Democrats would take over both the Senate and the House of Representatives, defence stocks went into frenzy as markets predicted earlier withdrawals from the conflict. Such a response is a stark reminder that peace enforcement missions must, as much as possible, be kept separate from the domestic fluctuations of individual countries’ political spheres. That Tennessee and Rhode Island alone are able to hold more sway over a timetable for withdrawal than the circumstances in Iraq themselves, is a concerning state of affairs. Whilst one can never entirely dissect the workings of foreign missions from the political realities at home, multinational forces dilute such influence and are, as a result, generally more judicial.

The capacity to respond to growing crises in an increasingly interrelated world is an issue which must be taken up collectively, rather than unilaterally. While many complain about America’s isolated decisions to intervene in particular theatres of conflict, perhaps the more insidious problem is the failure to intervene in genuine situations of genocide and widespread crimes against humanity, which go unchecked when an accountable and capable body is lacking. The reality of modern warfare in situations such as these has become that UN peacekeeping missions often represent an approach which offers too little, too late; the coherency and consistency of a Standing Army may be one of the only ways to ensure adequate deterrence and assistance within the international community of the 21st Century.