India: An Emerging Military Power?

Summer 2006: Ahmadinejad’s Iran increases its provocation of the international community by affirming its right to possess nuclear weapons, and the pursuit of such research. From all sides, the influential political actors expressed their concern and threatened to refer the matter to the UN Security Council. Although such the uproar seems legitimate, the 1998 nuclear tests carried out by Indian scientists did not elicit such a virulent response at the time. International consultations and, more importantly, the beginning of bilateral negotiations between India and the United States, quickly appeased the international community. Why is there such a discrepancy in the way these seemingly analogous cases were handled? The explanation was given a few years after these events of 1998 by President Bush during a 2003 visit to New Delhi: India was a responsible nuclear military power, quite a brash statement when considering the geopolitical situation of the second most highly populated state on the planet.  How does India pursue such ambitious defense projects, including nuclear ones, while harmonizing strategic interests that are as numerous as they are complex?

While the emergence of China as a global power was already evident two decades ago, that of India has only recently been recognized. In reality, this change of status is not so much the result of an evolution of the analysis of Western international relations experts on the matter as it is a realization of India’s assets and responsibilities by its own political leaders. The double tradition of pacifism and non-alignment inherited from Ghandi and Nehru has long prevented India from playing a major role on the international scene, so much so that the claim to a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, legitimized by both the demographic and economic weight of India, has only recently emerged. Moreover, this claim has run up against a negative response best understandable in light of China’s hostility towards India. Nevertheless, Indian elites have acquired an unshakable belief in the strategic nature of their geographical, economic and political situation, to the point of a partial reevaluation of their diplomatic and military paradigms.

It was in this way that appeared the concepts of global power and its corollary, regional power—the center of modern Indian diplomacy. The goal here is to affirm its responsibility well beyond the regional area of South Asia on which India has traditionally exerted its influence, gradually extending it to all of Asia, then to the international community as a whole.

This new concept hinges on two inseparable facts: on the one hand, by nature of its geographical context, India finds itself a central player in the Asian diplomatic front since it has natural– though often conflicting – relations with countries such as China, Russia, Iran and Pakistan, precisely those nations likely to play a major role in the future of the region. On the other hand, the constancy of its economic growth – coming in around 8% a year – engenders new demands: capital, conveniently obtained from South-East Asia, and energy resources, abundant in the Middle East and Central Asia. 

It is therefore fitting that India is looking for lasting diplomatic relations with new partners, while still preserving the precarious balance of relations with its immediate neighbors.

Indeed, India maintains extremely difficult relations with its immediate neighbors, specifically Pakistan and Iran, and nourishes its relation with the other Asian giant, China, which is ambiguous at best. Only Russia seems to be a fully reliable partner with whom contact is both constant and cordial.

As regards Pakistan, the conflict concerning the border region of Kashmir has lasted for decades since the territorial status quo is not acceptable to either of the two parties. Although nuclear dissuasion seems sufficient to avoid any fatal escalation of violence, the situation continues to be extremely tense and more skirmishes are so frequent that half of the Indian army is mobilized on the Pakistani border. Moreover, the partnership initiated by the United States with Pervez Musharraf’s regime to bring to fruition the struggle against Islamist terrorism has put India in an awkward position relative to the White House, even though the American administration refuses to make its relations with India and Pakistan a zero-sum game.

In the case of Iran, the problem differs in that there is no direct conflict between the two nations. On the other hand, India’s need for petroleum would require a thaw in its relationship with Teheran made difficult because of Ahmadinejad’s bellicosity and his nuclear ambitions. If India wants to preserve its friendship with the United States, it must be careful not to appear too close to the Iranian regime. As in the Indo-Pakistani relationship, the Indo-Iranian relationship cannot be considered solely from a bilateral point of view, since the existence of a third party complicates the matter.

Finally, the diplomatic game with the most at stake, according to Indian experts, is the rivalry with Beijing, which is the only economic and military power in the region superior to India. In this specific case, the rivalry has recently played out as a struggle for influence with India trying to establish itself in South-East Asia – a region traditionally influenced by China – while China takes a stand in South Asia notably through its support of Pakistan and its nuclear ambitions.

In these circumstances, India is right to fear becoming gradually surrounded by the great regional powers, a predicament that even its excellent relationship with Russia and the United States cannot avert. The combination of the realization of its status as a global power and the threat from its immediate neighbors has led India to rethink its diplomatic outlook. However, effective diplomacy cannot exist without strong military power, which is why New Delhi is currently involved in very significant defense projects, particularly in the nuclear sector.

This displayed resolve to be considered a responsible military and nuclear power must adapt itself to a context that is more favorable than that of other states in the region. Consequently, the Indian army distinguishes itself as being one of the only one of its kind in Asian loyal to the regime in power. There has not been an uprising or coup since independence, making the army an operational tool on the level of other great Western democracies. A million men strong, boasting highly qualified officers largely trained in Russia, the army boasts a diversified and modern arsenal. Its equipment comes primarily from Russia, which provides Sukhoi and Mig planes, among other things, but also from Israel, which has positioned itself as India’s secondary supplier of military equipment, and finally from the United Kingdom and France which sell Jaguars and Mirages to the Indian Air Force.

The stakes in the defense sector are fairly straightforward: to ensure interior security and to command of a modern preemptive force in case of retaliation, particularly nuclear. It is by taking account of these high stakes that the Indian defense budget doubled between 1998 and 2005, though it never exceeded 3% of the GDP.  These stakes were also instrumental in the definition of new objectives best described under the umbrella of a war doctrine. Within the framework of this doctrine, India would create a joint command to support combined military operations. This would require primarily the development of a nuclear Triad, that is, development of the nuclear capacity in each of the three military branches: ballistic missile bases for the Army, strategic bombers for the Air Force, and nuclear submarines for the Navy.

Consequently, India would dispose of a military force that would enable it to react to potential Chinese or Pakistani attacks. Indeed, though India has been moving towards disarmament on the diplomatic level, the intensification of its nuclear program stems from historical events—from the first Chinese nuclear tests in 1964 to the war against Pakistan. This same subtle brand of Indian nuclear politics is evident in its repeated refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on the grounds that it would legitimize the existence of the five established nuclear superpowers. Today, experts estimate that the Indian army has around 50 nuclear warheads, with a production capacity that could be elevated to 150 in the case a serious threat. The current production of battleships will elevate the Indian Navy to the fourth largest in the world by 2010 (moving it ahead of France) and it is already in sixth place, acting on its desire to control the Indian Ocean and to make the Navy the pride of the Indian nuclear Triad. Provided that a joint command is effectively created, India will be a first-rate military power, in line with its aforementioned new diplomatic objectives.

In a currently dangerous region, amidst Iranian and North Korean nuclear provocation, Islamic terrorist recruitment centers in Pakistan and elsewhere, and the imperious attitude of China – which is trying to impose itself as a natural rival to the United States – it seems that the emergence of India as a responsible diplomatic and military power is undeniably a stabilizing regional force. However, the delicate balancing act required of the Indian leaders, undertaken so as not to upset the United States, Russia or China, is an extremely arduous one. It seems, given all of this, quite just that India’s efforts be rewarded, at the very least, with the permanent seat at the UN Security Council it so covets.