Analysis: Waltz with Nasrallah

The mainstream media has eagerly concluded that Hezbollah’s popularity and legitimacy has substantially increased, particularly among poverty-ridden Shi’ite communities. Testimony to this increasing support and respect for the American-dubbed terrorist Islamic militant movement was the celebration activities of fireworks, car honking, and Hezbollah-flag waving on the streets of Beirut among Beirutis and the displaced alike. General Secretary Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah is declaring what he calls a Lebanese victory, a triumph for both Syrian President Bashar Assad and Iranian one-of-a-kind Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Israeli supremacy and American arrogance have been undermined as their military and foreign policy calculations have proven to be seriously misguided. Yet, take a closer look into the destroyed yet rapidly recovering Lebanon, and one can quickly find smudges in an oil painting that has yet to dry.

The Deal

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Hezbollah’s ability to launch independent reconstruction projects, provide financial compensation mechanisms, and take advantage of popular enthusiasm for its self-declared victory are cause for concern for Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Seniora’s government who have somehow managed to remain in power. Kidnapping two Israeli soldiers without forewarning Lebanese authorities, dragging the country into despicable disaster, and now assuming the role of the victor and the true savior of the Lebanese by immediately reconstructing the country are another way of saying that Hezbollah has crossed the line one too many times. A slowly fuming Prime Minister has now been cornered as to what to do.

Should Seniora blatantly join mainstream political rhetoric and associate his government with Hezbollah’s self-proclaimed victory, he will undermine his government’s rights to sovereignty and state authority. But should he side against the popular party, his cabinet, which includes two Hezbollah members, Minister of Energy and Water Mohammad Fneish and Minister of Labor Trad Hamadeh, may fragment. Additionally, the March 14 forces, which Seniora ultimately represents, will be victim to the people’s accusations of being unpatriotic, weak, and puppets of the growing American Empire. Seniora’s ability to maintain his moderate tone in light of the past month’s catastrophes deserves a standing ovation. However, the true challenge has just begun: retaining legitimacy with Nasrallah two steps ahead of the game.

Friend or Foe?

But all is not lost for the Lebanese Prime Minister. In the coming months, Seniora’s strategy for government continuity and effective state rebuilding is nationalism and political/economic reform strategy. For the time being, his government should let Hezbollah reap the fruits of its newly added prestige and legitimacy as many Lebanese’s delight in the end of the conflict settles down. Recently out of the crosshairs of Israeli aggression and functioning under a delicate internationally brokered ceasefire, those who were displaced from the South are gladly returning home, registering their property damage to Hezbollah’s offices for financial compensation, and rebuilding their lives. Their hopes are high and many of their assumptions for the future are perhaps too optimistic. There are also those who have only begun to show sympathy towards Hezbollah following the classic rules of the only too familiar political adage “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” With Israel being the primary enemy and Hezbollah being Israel’s enemy, the alliance changes and Hezbollah becomes the friend. This popular perception, however, is only context-deep. A few months down the line, assuming the cease fire lasts, this popular attitude will begin to notice that the status quo has in fact not changed; Israel continues to exist and still poses a threat to Lebanese security, the economy remains paralyzed and unable to attract foreign investment, and poverty levels are higher than ever. No matter how innovative Hezbollah is, they will not be able to put an end to the daily struggles of one million people. In due time, Hezbollah will be held accountable for dragging the country into such unnecessary destruction. And unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately, the bottom of Hezbollah’s treasure chest can only be so deep. Although negative sentiments towards Nasrallah will not become the standard among the deprived, displeasure towards the continuing status quo will most likely surface. Seniora’s government should take advantage of such discontentment by assuming a positive leadership role in the country’s rejuvenation.

Nationalist Prerogatives: Lebanon, Syria, or Iran?

Seniora’s government, meanwhile, should consistently use nationalist Lebanese discourse to appease the disenchanted and keep Hezbollah’s rampant popularity in check. Reminding the Lebanese that they all struggled together to keep their country intact and congratulating them for doing a job well done will encourage genuine unity and promote a spirit of reconciliation. Furthermore, the government should invite all Lebanese to participate in this quest for unity and development, including Hezbollah. To promote unity, Seniora should amicably encourage Nasrallah to participate in the nation’s potential prosperity, both as a tactic of conciliation, and because, realistically speaking, Nasrallah will remain around for a very, very long time. Suggesting that Hezbollah’s military wing join the Lebanese National Army is the first step towards institutionalizing this agenda. Although the loyalty of Hezbollah’s soldiers will remain to Nasrallah, such loyalty will slowly transgress into loyalty to the Lebanese state. Setting a new, fresh list of priorities based on nationalist necessities, will allow Seniora’s government to become one that was created by the people and undeniably for the people. His moving tears during an Arab League session opened a new chapter in Lebanese leadership: what was poignant was not just the tears but the fact that for the first time in recent history, the Lebanese have a leader who feels for them, talks with them, and most importantly, believes in their ability to defy destruction and proudly survive.

If Nasrallah indeed believes his party is a symbol of Lebanese nationalism, he will enthusiastically advocate such a policy, as set forth by the Lebanese government. But for Nasrallah, this might mean making some changes to his policy. If he does go ahead with his Lebanese prerogatives, he will be asked to make a choice: either the Syria-Iran camp or Lebanon, but not both. Stretching nationalist language to justify an Iranian and Syrian agenda can only go so far and the Lebanese will in due time notice and appreciate that Lebanon is neither Syria nor Iran. They will demand that Hezbollah be loyal to Lebanon alone. Loyalty cannot exist in two such diverging camps.

One, Two Three; One, Two Three

Today, Seniora and various government officials have a clear understanding that no entity can act on behalf of the Lebanese except the Lebanese government. In due time, Seniora will ensure that each and each and every Lebanese agrees with this necessity. Should there be no consensus on this vital point, no political and economic progress will be able to take place, and all efforts geared towards unity and growth will be in vain. Until then, Seniora’s cabinet and Hezbollah will be pivoting around each other’s interest zones in a stiff, love-and-hate dance step. Seniora’s government should take a proactive stance towards the country’s reconstruction by working on the ground with humanitarian organizations like the Higher Relief Committee to assess the humanitarian damage done to the country. Furthermore, the government should collaborate with the private sector and Arab countries to facilitate money being pumped into the country to speed its rehabilitation process. Measures of cooperation with the United Arab Emirates should be repeated with other Arab countries.

The Lebanese government must also assume the role of the people’s protector by guaranteeing that the unprecedented deployment of the Lebanese army in the south is a success story. The army’s cooperation with the international peacekeeping and expanded UNIFL force will be a signal to the international community that the Lebanese government is sovereign and growing stronger. Seniora should continue to consistently call for the full implementation of UN SC Resolution 1701 which encompasses the governments Seven Point Proposal that stipulates that only the Lebanese Army should retain weapons and function on all Lebanese territory. This will serve as a hint to Nasrallah that while his party’s participation in the government is welcome, he should assume a hands-off policy by not intervening in the government’s obligations to provide financial help and social support for the Lebanese. This will be critical for Nasrallah to retain his popularity in the long-term: if he chooses to side against the government, he would be assuming a non-Lebanese position which would conflict with his nationalist Lebanese predicaments. But if he recognizes that in order for him to survive in the long run he must enter a new realm of political and military participation with the government, Nasrallah and his party would transform from an Islamic militant organization into a purely political partner with the Lebanese government. This will be the only way for him to calm calls for the organization to dissolve and will render accusations made by Israel and the United States that label the group as a target for the infamous war on terror ridiculously unrealistic and immature.

Poker, Politics, and a Waltz

For the time being, Seniora and his government are perceived as a fragile democratic government in the eyes of the international community. However, while Nasrallah has used up most of his bargaining chips this past month, albeit the continual hostage of the two Israeli soldiers, Seniora has his hands full with different playing cards and a few political tricks up his sleeve. Even though Israel claims it has successfully handicapped much of Hezbollah’s military capabilities, the group denies Israel’s estimates. Yet, Hezbollah’s secretive nature and unwillingness to share with the world concrete statistics of military losses might just mean that Israel is right or close enough. Regardless of the facts, it will take a while for Iranian and Syrian financial assistance to re-establish Hezbollah’s guerilla pre-eminence, but this time any moves towards military enhancement will take place under Seniora’s watchful eye. What matters for Seniora’s government is recognizing when the time is right. Once disenchantment becomes the norm on the streets, Seniora will be able to abandon his inferior position and take position as the forefront player in Lebanon’s development and future. Until then, Nasrallah will lead this tense political waltz.